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L STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal of an interlocutory order entitled "Ruling on Motion to Set Aside 
Summary Judgment and to Compel Arbitration." See Record at p. 125-129; see also 
copy attached at Addendum to this Brief. The Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this 
matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (Supreme Court has jurisdiction over 
"orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the Court of Appeals 
does not have original appellate jurisdiction"). 
II. STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue Presented 
The issue presented is whether the district court erred in ruling that 
Defendants/Appellees had not waived their arbitration right, and therefore granting 
Defendants/ Appellees' Rule 60(b) motion to set aside the default judgment and compel 
arbitration, when Defendants/Appellees were personally served yet failed to appear, 
respond to, or raise any defenses to the Complaint; failed to attend the hearing on the 
Petition for Default Judgment after being notified thereof by the Court; and failed to raise 
the arbitration issue from the date they were personally served on October 27, 2001, past 
the date Default Judgment was entered on March 5, 2003, until they finally served a Rule 
60(b) Motion on July 9, 2002, raising therein for the first time the issue of arbitration. 
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Standard of Review 
The standard of review which governs review of rulings on Rule 60(b) motions 
generally is "abuse of discretion." See Board of Educ. v. Cox, 1 Utah 2d 385, 384 P.2d 
806 (Utah 1963). However, the district court's legal conclusion which formed the basis 
of the Court's ruling, i.e. that Defendants/Appellees did not waive their arbitration right, 
is reviewed for legal correctness, see Chandler v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Utah, 833 
P.2d 356 (Utah 1992), and a decision on a Rule 60(b) motion which is premised on 
flawed a legal conclusion constitutes an abuse of discretion. See Lund v. Brown, 2000 
UT 75, U 9,11 P.3d 277 (Utah 2000). 
Preservation Below 
The issue presented was raised below in Plaintiff/Appellant's "Memorandum in 
Opposition to Motion to Compel Arbitration and Rule 60(b) Motion for Relief from 
Default Judgment." See Record at 91-103. 
III. DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL 
PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
Defendants/Appellees brought their motion to set aside and compel arbitration 
pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6), which provides as follows: 
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in 
the furtherance of justice relieve a party . . . from a final 
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons:... 
(6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the 
judgment. 
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There is no issue as to the existence of the arbitration clause in the parties' 
contract, nor is there an issue that if that clause had been raised properly, it would have 
been enforceable; the issue is whether Defendants/Appellees' waived their contractual 
arbitration right. Nevertheless, Defendants/Appellees cited Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 la-3 
regarding the enforceability of arbitration clauses, and it is thus included in this 
subsection: 
A written agreement to submit any existing or future 
controversy to arbitration is valid, enforceable, and 
irrevocable, except upon grounds existing at law or equity to 
set aside the agreement, or when fraud is alleged as provided 
in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an interlocutory appeal of the district court's "Ruling on Motion to Set 
Aside Summary Judgment and to Compel Arbitration." See Record at 125-129. 
Plaintiff/Appellant Cedar Surgery Center, L.L.C. (hereafter "Cedar Surgery Center") sued 
and personally served Defendants/Appellees Sherry Bonelli and Bonelli & Associates 
(hereafter "Bonelli & Associates") on October 28, 2001. See Record at 2-14 (Complaint); 
23, 26 (Certificates of Service). After Bonelli & Associates failed to respond, their 
default was entered. See Record at 63-64. The Court noticed up a hearing regarding the 
petition for entry of default judgment, see Record at 34-35, which Bonelli & Associates 
failed to attend. See Record at 38 (Minutes from Hearing). The Court then considered 
affidavits provided by Cedar Surgery Center on February 27, 2002, see Record at 41-62, 
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and granted Default Judgment on March 5, 2002. See Record at 63-64. Bonelli & 
Associates served a Motion to Compel Arbitration and Rule 60(b) Motion for Relief from 
Default Judgment on July 9,2002. See Record at 71-90. The district court granted this 
motion, set aside the default judgment, and ordered the parties to arbitrate. See Record at 
125-129. Cedar Surgery Center petitioned for permission to file an interlocutory appeal, 
which was granted by this Court. 
V. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Cedar Surgery Center's Complaint alleges that it entered into contracts with 
Bonelli & Associates, whereunder Bonelli & Associates promised to perform specialized, 
critical professional services necessary for the newly constructed Cedar Surgery Center to 
secure the licenses required for it to begin functioning as a surgical facility, and that this 
caused a long delay in Cedar Surgery Center's beginning its surgical business, which in 
turn caused huge financial losses. See Record at 2-14 (Complaint). 
2. Bonelli & Associates were personally served in California on October 28, 
2001. See Record at 23, 26 (Certificates of Service). 
3. Bonelli & Associates never filed an Answer or a responsive pleading. 
See Record, passim, and at 29-30 (Default Certificate). 
4. Bonelli & Associates's default was entered on November 28, 2001. See 
Record at 63-64. 
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5. The Court set a January 3,2002 hearing regarding the petition for entry of 
default judgment, and sent notice to Bonelli & Associates on January 17, 2001. See 
Record at 34-35. 
6. Bonelli & Associates failed to attend the hearing on January 3, 2002. See 
Record at 38 (Minutes from Hearing). 
7. On February 7, 2002, Cedar Surgery Center submitted affidavits detailing 
the damages it suffered. See Record at 41-62. 
8. On March 5, 2002, the Court granted Default Judgment. See Record at 63-
64. 
9. On July 9, 2002, Bonelli & Associates served a Motion to Compel 
Arbitration and Rule 60(b) Motion for Relief from Default Judgment. See Record at 71-
90. The Motion was filed under Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6) and set forth as its sole 
argument for setting aside the default judgment the existence of an arbitration clause in 
the parties' contract. See id. 
10. Bonelli & Associates's Memorandum made clear, "This motion is not 
brought under any of the typical forgiveness clauses found in subsections (1) through (3) 
of Rule 60(b) (i.e. excusable neglect)." See id. 
11. Cedar Surgery Center did not dispute that the arbitration clause would have 
been enforceable if properly raised in response to the lawsuit, but argued that Bonelli & 
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Associates had waived their contractual right to arbitrate by not raising it in the course of 
the litigation leading up to the granting of judgment in the case. See Record at 91-103. 
12. The district court granted Bonelli & Associates's motion, set aside the 
default judgment, and ordered the parties to arbitrate, reasoning that Bonelli & Associates 
had not waived their contractual right to arbitrate because they "did not participate in the 
litigation whatsoever, and certainly not to a point that could be viewed as 'substantial' 
and 'inconsistent with an intent to arbitrate.555 See Record at 125-129 (quoting Central 
Fla. Invs. v. Parkwest Assocs., 2002 UT 3, % 26, 40 P.3d 599, 609 (Utah 2002)). 
VI. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The right to arbitrate is waivable. Chandler v. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 833 P.2d 
356 (Utah 1992) 
Parties who are personally served, fail to file a responsive pleading, allow a default 
certificate to be entered, fail to attend the hearing regarding their default after being sent 
notice from the Court, and allow substantial time to go buy and default judgment to be 
entered against them, all without raising their right to arbitrate, have thereby waived that 
right. 
Utah case law which allows parties who do not immediately raise arbitration, but 
who do so before they engage in substantial participation in the litigation which would be 
is inconsistent with an intent to arbitrate, see, e.g., Central Fla. Invs., has not addressed 
the situation involving parties who fail to respond or participate whatsoever, and allow 
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default judgment to be entered against them. Such parties should not be able to hide 
behind a misapplication of the substantial participation standard, citing their very 
inaction and ignoring of the litigation process as a justification for relief. 
Parties who fail to participate at all in litigation, and allow default judgment to be 
entered against them, are most deserving of any litigants of the law's edict that they have 
waived their arbitration right. (Remember, too, that Bonelli & Associates did not base 
their Rule 60(b) motion on excusable neglect, and that substantial time and a duly-noticed 
hearing transpired between the entry of default and the entry of default judgment.) 
A standard of law which would allow parties to raise arbitration post default 
judgment (without basing their motion on any accompanying grounds to set aside, such as 
excusable neglect), would condone and award parties who ignore and fail to respond 
whatsoever to the judicial process. 
The substantial participation standard rightly comes to the aid of parties who act 
properly in response to litigation, i.e., they appear and answer when summoned, and this 
standard operates to excuse such litigants if they fail to immediately raise the issue of 
arbitration, based on sound underlying reasoning that so long as they do not wait too long, 
the right should be enforced. Defendants such as Bonnelli and Associates —who are 
personally served yet who failed to take any action whatsoever, throughout a prolonged, 
methodical default process leading up to eventual entry of default judgment - do not fit 
into this category. Such defendants have waived the opportunity to participate in the 
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litigation and have waived the rights, such as the right to compel arbitration, which they 
could have raised if they had responded and participated. The law should not reward 
them for refusing to participate whatsoever. 
VII. ARGUMENT 
Bonelli & Associates raised only one issue as the basis for their motion to 
compel arbitration and to set aside the default judgment: they pointed out that the 
contract underlying the case contained an arbitration clause* (which Cedar Surgery 
Center does not dispute), and argued that even their post-judgment raising of this 
contractual arbitration right justifies setting aside the default judgment under Utah R. 
Civ. P. 60(b)(6) ("any reason justifying relief). Bonelli & Associates did not move to 
set aside based upon excusable neglect; they even made extra effort to clarify this in 
their Memorandum: "This motion is not brought under any of the typical forgiveness 
clauses found in subsections (1) through (3) of Rule 60(b) (i.e. excusable neglect)." 
The district court erred in granting the motion because Bonnelli & Associates 
waived their right to arbitrate. Utah case law is crystal clear that contractual rights to 
arbitration are waivable. See Chandler v. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 833 P.2d 356 (Utah 
1992). By failing to oppose, appear, defend, or object to the proceedings below, at any 
stage during their pendency (default was entered on November 28, 2001; a duly noticed 
hearing was held on January 3, 2002; default judgment was entered on March 5, 2002), 
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BoneIIi Ac Associates elem h> ^viivcd ihcir arbitration rights and defenses. See id 
(iirhiiMikHh ritihls ,nv waivable). 
Boncili & Associates argued below, and the ui.ii i mini .iT.-iieoush agreed, that 
the Chandler case. ^ < . - *lvr inaction and non-participation, 
and gives • • • • mt wiiirc process and belatedly raise'arbitration, even 
-il'ItT judgment is entered, and even without a motion loi <>()(l>> niiel basi <l upon 
excusable neglect. The true meaning and i il •• m.i'i \• ( • 'handler does not support, 
howrever„ ,,, .*,-.i.. ^ >• * »».i ?T' X Associates' position Tn Chandler Ccm\ iuid 
s nad waived their right to arbitration, despite thi j\<i, ..... 
defendants in that case actually raised the issue during the pei >c .-edmas 
answering and conducting seveul in nlii". ol'diseoverv \ o^c la. ^i if ]' he 
defendants in ihe IIISI-HU nisi were far /wore delinquent than the defendants .in Chandler 
* • »•»: 'hi- arbitration issue - indeed they never appeared and raised ihe issue dm nig 
the entire pendency of the proceeding iiiu.,.gj. ..*., -. In/low. if the Court 
found that the LJiiimtit t dclend; - '. ed arbitration, the deiendants in the instant 
a . -: •- \ r:i j M Iv have been found to have waived arbitration.l 
xChandler did not specifically address situations where u<jienuaiu:> ua\e wholly failed 
to respond or raise the issue of arbitration and have had default judgment entered against them. 
This specific issue is an issue of first impression in Utah. Courts from other states that have 
addressed the specific issue of arbitration raised for the first time in conjunction with a motion to 
set aside default judgment have supported waiver. See, e.g., State ex rel. Barden and Robeson 
Corp. v. Hill, 539 S.E.2d 106 (W.V. 2000) (denying writ seeking to overturn court's denial of 
motion to set aside default judgment, where motion was based upon argument that the contract 
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The ruling below relies upon a incorrect interpretation and application of the 
ruling in Chandler and the meaning of the word "participate" as used therein. The 
Chandler Court stated that a party would not be found to have waived arbitration, 
despite having failed to raise the issue immediately in their answer, if they did not wait 
and participate to such a point in the litigation that their actions were inconsistent with 
an intent to arbitrate. See id. at 359. In other words, failing to raise the issue in an 
answer or an immediate motion to stay, would not be fatal to arbitration, so long as the 
litigants did not wait too long and allow the proceedings to move forward too far. In 
this case, the party asserting arbitration did not assert it during the pendency of the 
proceedings whatsoever. In this case the defendants defaulted entirely. They ignored 
and disregarded these proceedings by (1) choosing not to respond to this lawsuit 
following personal service: (2) choosing not to attend or respond to the hearing 
regarding default judgment and damages following notice by the Court; and (3) 
choosing to do nothing until default judgment had been entered (over three months after 
the default certificate was entered) and even until several months had gone by after 
default judgment was entered. Bonelli & Associates ignored the summonses, went into 
default, ignored the proceedings for months and months, ignored the Court's notice of 
hearing on default judgment and damages, and only well after default judgment was 
action should have been arbitrated and upon an assertion of arbitration rights thereunder, just as 
in this case). 
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r i. icij in. (akvliy a^vrinl the right to arbitrate as the sole basis for a 60(h)(6). lioiiclli 
& Associates' waiver of arbitration rights is in fact much more clear and "<U»T than vv.i.>i 
the defendants' waiver vr C<-K,.t . . . . ,*n:.»'- die 
defendants <n (/«.,* . : . .is ;seii those lights daring the litigation 
]--)!ielli X, Assoc int much less worth} of being allowed to assert arbitral it,. j 
than were the defendants in Chandler, Bone in <V /v-^oeiates elu A 111"1 1 me 
lawsuit, and ignored Cedar Snidery 1 "aita us pLiinliH' as well as the Court (i.e. who set 
and sent nciki1 ml d nc 11 inr «.1 he default judgment to Bonelli & Associates)until well 
• 1 Orient was entered. Buiielli & Associates' non-participation was a willful 
choice not to participate or respond or a* s. m u n >u ludr-g arbitration 
11 \ 'hi ;i) whatsoc • ci1 is all about. 
"*/V•-. as well as subsequent cases following Chandler, i.e. < * >/, ?. 
v. Parkwest Assocs., 2002 I IT "V V 26 -I -.land loi tiiu 
proposition that parties who l»,i\ 1 pn»J>LTI> responded to a lawsuit but who have failed • 
•* .!V'* ^ert arbitration rights, may still assert those rights, and will not be 
found to have waived them, so long as the hligation iu.. u< u v nu1 ht u -ml M . point 
where the assertion of those i ijjjils \\ 'I'M I"*1 inn insistent and unfair with what the 
deleiid.iiils had d^nr m the litigation up to that point. 
This case is wholly different "Honelli & Associates LIIOM u > ' > h> i|i, tpioi"1 and 
allow the proceedings to go lorwaid WIIII'MII Ihein lm months and months, through 
personal service, entry of default, a hearing, submission of affidavits and judgment 
paperwork, entry of judgment, and the passage of additional months of time thereafter. 
They are not like a party who responds to a lawsuit, and raises and asserts arbitration 
rights at some point subsequent to their initial answer, in which case a Court may 
consider, under Chandler, still ordering arbitration. No, Bonelli & Associates never 
asserted those rights, and allowed the case to be resolved and completed without the 
issue ever being raised. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The right to arbitrate is waivable. Chandler v. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 833 P.2d 
356 (Utah 1992) 
Parties who are personally served, fail to file a responsive pleading, allow a default 
certificate to be entered, fail to attend the hearing regarding their default after being sent 
notice from the Court, and allow substantial time to go buy and default judgment to be 
entered against them, all without raising their right to arbitrate, have thereby waived that 
right. 
Utah case law which allows parties who do not immediately raise arbitration, but 
who do so before they engage in substantial participation in the litigation which would be 
is inconsistent with an intent to arbitrate, see, e.g., Chandlers and Central Fla. Invs., has 
not addressed the specific situation involving parties who fail to respond or participate 
whatsoever, and allow default judgment to be entered against them. Such parties should 
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not? -nisnnplication of the substantial participation standard, 
c 'i : their very inaction and ignoring ofihe litigation process as a justitkaihm im n i« i 
Parties who fail to participate al <•.. . . m .HIJ .ilbm .IHinill indgmenttobe 
entered against thu. a, _ . . - . , ! ants of the law's edict that they have 
waived iheir arbnrimni - Again, Bonelli & Associates did not base their Ruu -
motion on excusable neglect, and substantial time and a duly-noticed hearing *. . 
between the entry of default and the entry ul default judgment > 
A standard of law \\\\K\\ wnuM iiJlnvv parlies to raise arbitration post default 
, , . :^ tlieir motion on any accompanying grounds to set aside, sucn as 
unable neglect), would condone and award parties v\i„> igj,w; ....:: 
whatsoever to the judicial process. 
I he substantial participant^ ^undard rightly comes to the aid of parties who act 
•e tn litigation, i.e., they appear and answer when summoned, and this 
standard operates to excuse such litigants if they fail to annkd; > 
arbitration, based on sound under!) nig IUIM unng (1 1 long as \\v^ do not wait too long, 
the j'l^lit .tiithiiii in' CI\UM\X\\, Defendants such as Bonnelli and Associates —who are 
personally served yet who failed to take any action whatsoever, throughout a pi i lionized, 
methodical default process leading up to eventual.; ' : ! -.> not fit 
into this category ... . > ,,;...,,lair "' -.,-.., *. ?*> participate in ilk-
•. .- . . , : . . . i ^uch as the right 10 compel arbitration. \\hich tu~r 
could have raised if they had responded and participated. The law should not reward 
them for refusing to participate whatsoever. 
Wherefore Plaintiff asks the Court reverse and remand this case to the district 
court, directing it to rule that Bonelli waived its arbitration rights and vacate its ruling 
on Bonelli5s motion to set aside and compel arbitration. 
DATED this 17th day of March, 2003, 
JENSEN, GRAFF & BARNES, LLP 
RANDALL C. ALLEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellant 
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FILED 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND 
IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH AUG ! 9 » 
CEDAR SURGERY CENTER, 1,1 .('.. 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SHERRY BONELLI (individually and dba 
Bonelli & Associates), and BONELLI & 
ASSOCIATES, a California general 
partnership, 
Defendants. 
, nth DISTRICT OOUHT 
IRON COUNTY 
DEPUTY CLERK. fry,*-. 
RULING ON MOTION TO SET ASIDE 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND TO 
COMPEL ARBITRATION 
Case • \ 
Judge J. Philip Lves 
This matter comes before the Court pursuant to Defendants Mi ..•;.;• • -j A 
Arbitration and Rule 60(b) I ( Inlum lur ISVIIH'IMI i Vtmilt J m I giiuiil, filed July 12/2002. Plaintiff 
filetl ,iii < Opposition thereto on July 22, 200?. mid Defendants tiled a Reply on July 30, 2002 
The matter was heard on August 1..:, AH)^ at w.iu. u^... , ^ • i - .•>.•:.•• 
Having reviewed The (tatties itictnoi'itr ' - - • "v-aul the- panics* arguments, having ro u ^ed 
the relevant law on the matter, and being fully advised in the premises, the Court now rules as 
fellows. 
CKGROUND 
Plaintiff Cedar Surgen t enu.. . - ^ndant Sherry 
Itiiiielli and lin pnrlncrslup - ^ ^ u n b e r \\J9 20ui. Piamulf had I)elendants personally served 
-2-
with a Summons and Complaint on October 28, 2001. Defendants did not file an answer, or any 
other response, to the Complaint. Plaintiff took Default against Defendants on November 29, 
2001. Defendants filed the current Motion on July 12, 2002, seeking to enforce a provision of 
the contract between the parties that provided that all disputes between the parties would be 
submitted to binding arbitration. 
Plaintiff asserts that Defendants waived the right to arbitration by inaction and a complete 
failure to respond in any way to the Complaint. Plaintiff point to the fact that Defendants did not 
assert the right to arbitration until eight (8) months after Default had been taken. 
Defendants argue that there has been no "substantial participation" in this litigation by 
them, and no evidence of an intent to waive arbitration, and thereby no waiver of the right to 
arbitrate. 
Neither party has been able to locate any Utah case law that squarely addresses the factual 
setting of this case. 
ANALYSIS 
Defendant here took no steps at all that could be viewed as participation in the litigation, 
let alone substantial steps as required under the law, and cannot be said to have waived the right 
to arbitration. 
As the Utah Supreme Court held in Chandler v. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 833 P.2d 365, 
(Utah 1992), "a waiver occurs when the party seeking arbitration substantially participates in 
litigation, to a point inconsistent with an intent to arbitrate, and this participation results in 
prejudice to the opposing party." Chandler, at 358. The Court did not define "participation", but 
the clear inference from the case law is that one must answer the complaint or motion the court 
-3-
for relief, other than a dismissal, before one can be said to have participated in the litigation. 
In I he present L.I «i\ Delcndanl did nulliiiijj »il all '"Jini s r n n l \\\\\\ the i 'miiplainl ^ h u h 
* o u h e d HI the entry oi \ i -L,uh - is difficult to see how Defendant thereby "substantially 
~" . v • • paicvi - - • i; K, i Uit_,aiv:. . , iv.i-w: tlii.1 m d,'"' [t]he par (:> claiming A aiv er has 
the burden of establishing participation and preuidiee " ('handler, at ?oli Plaintiffs here argue 
that "Defendants' non-participation, was a
 wmfui choice not to participate or respond 01 iv . 
defenses or rights (ineludin|> arbitration rights). ."'""" Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition, J 3 
(emphasis in original). It appears the even the Plaintiff agrees LH.H JK n .uion ofthe Defendants 
vus not pmliupulion, bill .i division im i m participate. 
htionally, the Chandler court stated thai tor waiver of the right to arbitration to occi it, 
the s. • ! .-a- u •, • tic . . .". 
Chandler, at ^ 8 . It cannot in uood faith be argued that Deleodants" choice not to do a thing was 
inconsistent : - ^ 
litigation, the Defendants would seem to be asserting their right to have the dispute submitted to 
at I titration, rather than In become involved JII the litigation lilnl by Hie I I.iinlill in i imtrnvenlioii 
0f fa contract terms. 
Further, as held by UIL I ;iun upteme Court in Cent. Fla. Invs., J.I^. -. i-aiKwest Assocs., 
2002 U r3,40P.3d599: 
This first part of the Chandler test [determining wb. ; . re was sn1 
participation to a point inconsistent with the intent il 1 •»^ 
actions of the party seeking arbitration, and wheth ., an 
intent to submit to the jurisdiction of the court and pursue redress through 
litigation. 
Cent. Fla. Invs.. Inc., at f26 , K) P 3< ! i til • 5 D 5 
-4-
Here, Defendants certainly took no actions which could be viewed as evidencing "an 
intent to submit to the jurisdiction of the court." 
Because of its determination that the Defendants did not substantially participated in this 
matter, and certainly not to a point inconsistent with an intent to arbitrate, the Court need not 
reach the second part of the test set forth in Chandler, whether Plaintiff was prejudiced by 
Defendants actions (or inaction). 
CONCLUSION 
Defendants here undertook no action when served with the complaint herein and 
therefore did not participate in the litigation whatsoever, and certainly not to a point that could be 
viewed as "substantial" and "inconsistent with an intent to arbitrate." Defendants' Motion to 
Compel Arbitration is therefore granted, and the parties are ordered to submit to arbitration as 
provided in the parties' contract. 
The Default Judgment entered by this Court is hereby set aside as such judgment was 
obtained in contravention of terms of the parties' contract1, and therefore falls under Rule 
60(b)(6), which provides for relief from judgment "for any other reason justifying relief from the 
operation of the judgment." 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED this 19th day of August 2002. 
J./HILIP EVES 
district Court Judge 
Plaintiffs disregard for the mandatory arbitration clause could be viewed as a breach of the parties' 
contract. 
-5-
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BLUE CROSS BLUE SHIELD OF UTAH, 
Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance 
Company, a Massachusetts corporation. 
Gary I). Henderson. Steven G. Sholy. 
and Utah Dental Association, a Utah 
incorporated association, Defendants 
and Appellants. 
No syn-,10 
Supreme Court of Utah 
May 15, 1<J92. 
Insurer moved to compel arbitration 
The Third District Court, Salt Lake County, 
Timothy R Hanson, J , denied motion, and 
insurer appealed The Supreme Court, 
Hall, C.J., held that* (I) evidence supported 
finding that insurer participated in litiga-
tion to point inconsistent with arbitration, 
and (2) evidence supported finding of preju-
dice to insured arising from insurer's delay 
of assertion of right to arbitrate. 
Affirmed. 
Zimmerman, J , concurred in part, dis-
sented in part, and filed opinion in which 
Houe. Associate CJ. joined. 
stantial participation in litigation to no' 
inconsistent with intent to arbitrate a^ 
prejudice, that prejudice must relate to dX 
lay in assertion of right to arbitrate and 
that prejudice must be of such nature thai 
party opposing arbitration suffers somS 
real harm are legal standards, and whether 
trial court employed proper standard for 
finding waiver presents legal question 
which is reviewed for correctness 
3. Arbitration <s=>23.25 
In determining whether right of arU 
tration was waived, finding of existence of 
substantial participation in litigation to 
point inconsistent with intent to arbitrate 
and of existence of prejudice are factual in 
nature and should be reviewed as factual 
determinations 
1. Insurance C=».">7fi(l) 
Finding that insurer participated in liti 
gallon to point inconsistent with arbitration 
was supported by facts that insurer filed 
answer and cross claim, participated in dis 
covery for five months, and reviewed dis-
covery that had taken place prior to its 
entrance into case 
5. Insurance <£=>572 
Finding of prejudice to insureds result-
ing from insurer's delay of assertion of 
right of arbitration was supported by facts 
that insurer was able to take part in dis-
covery process which was far more exten-
sive than that allowed in arbitration and 
obtained information which could be used 
against insureds in arbitration, and that 
insureds undertook much of expense neces-
sary to prepare case for trial in conducting 
discovery and preparing to respond to «n 
surer's discovery request. 
1. Arbitration e=»23.4 
Waiver of right of arbitration must be 
based on both finding of participation in 
litigation to point inconsistent with intent 
to arbitrate and finding of prejudice; both 
prongs of this test turn on facts of individ-
ual case; furthermore, any real detriment 
is sufficient to support finding of prejudice. 
2. Arbitration <s=»23.4 
Requirements that ruling on waiver of 
right of arbitration rest on finding of sub-
Norman J. Younker, Michael L Chides 
ter, Salt Lake City, for plaintiffs and appel 
lees. 
Timothy C. Houpt, Salt Lake City, ^t 
Blue Cross Blue Shield. 
Phillip S. Ferguson, Salt Lake City, f°r 
Massachusetts Mut Life Ins. Co 
D. Gary Christian, Heinz J. Mahler. Salt 
Lake City, for Steven G. Sholy and Gary D 
Henderson. 
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David G. Williams, 
tah Dental Ass'n. 
Salt Lake City, for 
HALL, Chief Justice: 
Defendant Blue Cross Blue Shield of 
ftah appeals the denial of its motion to 
ampel arbitration. We affirm. 
The plaintiffs in this action are members 
f the Utah Dental Association ("UDA"). 
n November of 1987, plaintiffs filed a com-
laint in the Third Judicial District Court 
sserting that Massachusetts Mutual Life 
nsurance Company, Massachusetts Mutual 
gents Gary D. Henderson and Steven G. 
iholy, and the UDA are liable for the can-
eilation of their health insurance. 
The complaint alleged that in 1975, the 
JDA entered into an agreement with Blue 
>oss whereby the UDA agreed to endorse 
Slue Cross's health insurance plan and 
Jlue Cross agreed to insure all UDA mem-
bers regardless of any preexisting illnesses 
>r disabilities. In July of 1987, the UDA 
ancelled its endorsement of Blue Cross 
md began encouraging UDA members to 
>btam health insurance from Massachu-
setts Mutual. When Blue Cross discovered 
hat the UDA no longer endorsed its health 
nsurance, it notified UDA members that 
•heir benefits would terminate. There-
after, plaintiffs applied for coverage under 
Massachusetts Mutual's health plan, but 
coverage was denied due to serious illness-
es and physical impairments. 
The named defendants answered the 
complaint, and discovery procedures were 
commenced. On November 2, 1988, plain-
tiffs amended their complaint, joining Blue 
Cross as a defendant On November 22, 
*988, Blue Cross answered the complaint, 
Rising seventeen defenses but making no 
Mention of the existence of an arbitration 
agreement On this date, Blue Cross also 
"led cross-claims against the UDA, Massa-
chusetts Mutual, Henderson, and Sholy, 
^teging the rights to indemnity, apportion-
m e n t o f
 liability, and attorney fees. 
* K .C.ross a«"gucd that it sent an addendum to the . 
, .
c
 °
n8»nal insurance policy, which contained 
n £ arfbrilrali<>n clause, to plaintiffs. Several 
' Plaintiffs claimed that they never received the 
For the next five months, Blue Cross 
actively participated in discovery. On De-
cember 12, 1988, plaintiffs served a request 
for production of documents on Blue Cross. 
On December 21 and 22, Blue Cross partici-
pated in the depositions of three Massachu-
setts Mutual officials. These depositions 
were conducted in Springfield, Massachu-
setts. On December 30, 1988, plaintiffs 
requested a rule 30(bX6) designation of cor-
porate spokesman from Blue Cross in con-
junction with the deposition of Blue Cross's 
vice president On January 23, 1989, Blue 
Cross designated its corporate spokesman. 
On February 2, 1989, Blue Cross partici-
pated in the deposition of its vice president 
and circulated a stipulation for a protective 
order among all parties On February 8, 
1989, UDA submitted interrogatories to 
Blue Cross. On February 24, 1989, Blue 
Cross participated in the deposition of Mas-
sachusetts Mutual general agent, Larry 
Hanks. On March 9, 1988, plaintiffs 
served a request for production of doc-
uments on Blue Cross. On March 19, 1989, 
Blue Cross served interrogatories and a 
request for production of documents on 
plaintiffs. On March 21, 1989, Massachu-
setts Mutual answered Blue Cross's cross-
claims. 
On March 30, 1989, Blue Cross respond-
ed to the UDA's first set of interrogatories 
and raised, for the first time, a right of 
arbitration. Nevertheless, Blue Cross 
raised specific objections and provided an-
swers to the interrogatories. 
On April 7, 1989, Blue Cross filed a mo-
tion to compel arbitration and stay the pro-
ceedings. During argument on this mo-
tion, plaintiffs asserted that no contractual 
right of arbitration existed ' and, in the 
alternative, that Blue Cross waived its 
right to compel arbitration. The trial court 
issued a memorandum decision, ruling that 
Blue Cross had waived any alleged right of 
arbitration by "actively participating] in 
the litigation process" and that such partic-
ipation has "been to the extent that arbitra-
tion would work a substantial prejudice on 
addendum. Because of the court's ruling on the 
issue of waiver, it did not address whether a 
contractual right of arbitration existed. 
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the remaining parties." Pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-31a-19(l), Blue Cross ap-
peals the trial court's denial of its motion 
to force arbitration 2 
This case presents an issue of first im-
pression in this court: What standard 
should be employed in determining whether 
a party has waived a contractual right of 
arbitration? Although there is authority to 
the contrary,3 several jurisdictions have 
held that a waiver occurs when the party 
seeking arbitration substantially partici-
pates in litigation, to a point inconsistent 
with an intent to arbitrate, and this partic-
ipation results in prejudice to the opposing 
party.1 These cases base the requirement 
of prejudice on a recognition of a public 
policy in favor of arbitration.5 Because 
2. Utah Code Ann. § 7S-31a - l9 ( | ) provides. "An 
appeal may be taken bv any aggrieved party as 
provided by law for appeals on civil act ions 
from any court order: ( I) denying a mot ion to 
compel arbi t ra t ion." For cases holding that 
there is a right to a direct appeal from a denial 
of a mot ion denying arbitrat ion when a statute 
or rule expressly authorizes an appeal , see 
David B. Harr i son . Annotation. Appealability— 
Court Arbitration Order. 6 A.LR.4th 652. 675-78 
( 1 9 8 1 ) . 
3. See, e.g.. City of Niagara Falls v. Rudolph, 91 
A.D.2d 817. 4S8 N.Y.S.2d 97. 98 (1982); De Sa-
pio v. Kohlmeyer, 35 N.Y.2d 402. 362 N.Y.S.2d 
843. 846. 321 N.E.2d 770, 772 (1974). 
4. See, e.g.. Page v. Moseley. Hallgarten, Esta 
brook & Weeden, Inc., 806 F.2d 291. 293 (1st 
Cir.1986); Price v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, 
Inc.. 791 F.2d 1156. 1158 (5th Cir.1986); Rush v. 
Oppenheimer & Co.. 779 F.2d 885. 887 (2d Cir. 
1985); Sweater Bee by Banff v. Manhattan In 
dus.. 754 F.2d 457. 463 (2d Cir.). cert, denied. 
474 U.S. 819. 106 S.Ct. 68. 88 I. lid.2d 55 (1985); 
Reid Burton Constr. v. Carpenters Dist. Council. 
614 F.2d 698. 702 (10th Cir.1980); J & S Constr. 
Co. v. Travelers Indent. Co.. 520 F.2d 809, 809-10 
(1st Cir.1975). Keating v. Superior Court of 
Alameda County. 31 Cal.3d 584. 183 Cal.Rptr 
360. 372-73. 645 P.2d 1192. 1204-05 (1982). ap-
peal dismissed in part. 465 U.S. 1. 104 S.Ct. 852. 
79 L.Ed.2d 1 (1984); Board of Educ. Taos Mun. 
Schools v. The Architects,, 103 N.M. 462. 709 
P.2d 184. 185 (1985). Wood v. Millers Natl Ins.. 
96 N.M. 525. 632 P.2d 1163. 1165 (1981); United 
Nuclear Corp. v. General Atomic Co.. 93 N.M. 
105. 597 P.2d 290. 300. cert, denied, 444 U.S 
911. 100 S.Ct. 222. 62 L.Ed.2d 145 (1979). 
5. See, e.g.. Page. 806 F.2d at 293; Rush, 779 F.2d 
at 887; Sweater Bee by Banff, 754 F.2d at 461; 
Reid Burton Constr., 614 F.2d at 702; J 6i S 
Constr. Co.. 520 F.2d at 810; Board of Educ 
this court has also recognized the strong 
public policy in favor of arbitration "as an 
approved, practical, and inexpensive means 
of settling disputes and easing court con-
gestion." * it is appropriate to look to these 
jurisdictions for guidance. 
At first glance, the cases that apply this 
approach appear to reach disparate re-
sults.7 However, closer examination re-
veals that the main reason for the discrep-
ancies lies not in inconsistent application of 
the test, but rather, in the fact that the 
finding of both substantial participation 
and prejudice are factual determinations.* 
Therefore, results vary, depending on the 
facts presented in a particular case. 
Indeed, while there is some conflict in 
the case law,9 most courts consistently ap-
7r;«,s Uun Schools. 709 P.2d at 185. I mta! 
Nuclear Corp.. 597 P.2d at 299 
6. Hobmson & Wells. P.C r. Warren. 669 l\2d 
844. H16 (Utah 1983); see also Lin don City v. 
Engineer* Constr. Co.. 636 P.2d 1070. 107 3 (Utah 
1981) Ciannopulos v. Pappas. 15 P 2d 153. 356 
( U t a h 1932) . 
7. In Bernalillo County Medical Center Employ-
ees' Association v. Cancelosi, 92 N.M. 307. 587 
P 2d 960. 962 (1978). the New Mexico Supreme 
Court stated that an "extensive and brutally di 
verse body of law exists as to at what stage of 
the court proceedings waiver may be presented 
and determined." 
8. See. e.g.. Reid Burton Constr., 614 F.2d at 702 
("(Waiver) depends upon the facts of each 
case."); Burton-Dixie Corp. v. Timothy McCar-
thy Constr Co.. 436 F.2d 405. 408 (5th Cir. 1971) 
("[Waiver} depends upon the facts of each 
c a s e . ) . Weight Watchers of Quebec. Ltd. »•'• 
Weight Watchers Intl, Inc.. 398 F.Supp 1057. 
1059 (F.-.D.N.Y.1975) ("[Waiver turnsj on all the 
facts of the case."); Keating, 183 Cal Rptr at 
372. 645 P 2d at 1204 ("[Tlhe question of waiver 
is one of fact."); Doers v. Golden Gate Bridge. 23 
Cal.3d 180. 151 Cal.Rptr. 837. 839. 588 P.2d 
1261. 1263 (1979) ("Waiver of a contractual 
right to arbitration is ordinarily a question of 
fact."); Board of Educ. Taos Mun. Schools. 709 
P.2d at 185 ("[Waiver] depends on the facts of 
each case"). United Nuclear Corp., 597 P 2d at 
300 ( T h e question should be determined by the 
trier of facts based on the evidence in each 
case.'). 
9, Compare Wood, 632 P.2d at 1166 (arbitration 
waived when right asserted after adverse ruling 
on a motion to dismiss) with Rush, 779 F 2d at 
888 (filing motion to dismiss not inconsistent 
CHANDLER v. BLUE CROSS BLUE SHIELD Utah 359 
Cite M 833 P.24 354 (Utah 1992) 
ply the same legal principles. The party advantage in arbitration through partic-
claiming waiver has the burden of estab- ipation in pretrial procedures.14 Courts 
lishing substantial participation and preju- have also stated that prejudice exists when 
dice.10 While the party seeking arbitration the party seeking arbitration is attempting 
must participate in the litigation to a point to forum-shop after "the judicial waters 
inconsistent with arbitration, once this [have] . . . been tested." , s In addition, 
point has been reached, the determination prejudice has been found in situations 
of whether waiver has occurred rests solely where the party seeking arbitration allows 
on a finding of prejudice.11 Furthermore, the opposing party to undergo the types of 
the prejudice must result from the delay in expenses that arbitration is designed to 
the assertion of the right to arbitrate, not
 aneviate, such as the expense of preparing 
from factors that are inherent in arbitra-
 to a r g u e important pretrial motions " or 
tion itself, such as the severance of a claim
 t h e e x p e n s e 0f conducting discovery proce-
or limitations on remedies.12
 d u r e s t h a t a r e n o t a v a i l a b l e Jn arbitration." 
Though the cases consistently apply The finding of prejudice, however, has nev-
these principles, there is some conflict con- er been linked to any specific type of harm, 
cerning what particular facts are sufficient 
to support a finding of prejudice.13 How- [1] The general approach used in these 
ever, there is general agreement concern- cases is consistent with our case law deal-
ing the prejudicial nature of certain factual ing with arbitration.18 Mere delay should 
situations. Courts have recognized that not result' in a waiver of a method of dis-
prejudice can occur if a party gains an pute resolution that public policy clearly 
with intent to arbitrate). See also infra notes 17 
and 20. 
10. See. e.g.. Page, 806 F.2d at 293-94; Price. 791 
F.2d at 1158; Keating. 183 Cal.Rptr. at 372, 645 
P.2d at 1204; Board of Educ. Taos Mun. 
Schools. 709 P.2d at 185; United Nuclear Corp.. 
597 P.2d at 300. 
U. See, e.g., Page, 806 F.2d at 293; Rush, 779 
F.2d at 887; Sweater Bee by Banff. 754 F.2d at 
461; J & S Constr. Co.. 520 F.2d at 810; Keating. 
183 Cal.Rptr. at 372. 645 P.2d at 1204; Board of 
Educ. Taos Mun. Schools, 709 P.2d at 185; Unit-
ed Nuclear Corp.. 597 P.2d at 300. 
I*. See Rush, 779 F.2d at 890; Sweater Bee by 
Banff. ISA F.2d at 463. 
U- Sec United Nuclear Corp.. 597 P.2d at 299, 
where the New Mexico Supreme Court stated. 
lT]hcrc is disagreement from case to case as to 
what set of facts will justify a holding that a 
party has waived his rights to arbitration." See 
also infra note 17. 
u
- See, e.g.t Carcich v. Rederi A/B Nordie, 389 
P2d 692. 696 (2d Cir.1968); Liggett & Myers Inc. 
* Bloomficld. 380 F-Supp. 1044. 1047-48 
(S.D.N.Y.1974); Board of Educ. Taos Mun. 
Schools. 709 P.2d at 186. 
Xl% Woo<l. 632 P.2d at 1165; see also Jones Motor 
y- v- c"*uffeurs, 671 F.2d 38. 43 (1st Cir.)t cert. 
«?!*d. 459 U.S. 943. 103 S.Ct. 257. 74 L.Ed.2d 
**> (1982). 
^ L 5 ^ «•*-. Price, 791 F.2d at 1160; Weight 
Etchers of Quebec Ltd.. 398 F.Supp. at 1061; 
Board of Educ. Taos Mun. Schools. 709 P.2d at 
186. 
17. See. e.g.. Price. 791 F.2d at 1160; Board of 
Educ. Taos Mun. Schools. 709 P.2d at 186; see 
also Rush. 779 F.2d at 889. However, no preju-
dice results if the discovery relates to nonarbi-
trable claims which will be severed and sepa-
rately litigated, see. e.g.. Rush, 779 F.2d at 889; 
Dickinson v. Heinold Securities, Inc., 661 F.2d 
638, 642 (7th Cir.1981). and there is some con-
flict concerning the prejudicial nature of the 
initial stages of discovery. Compare Price, 791 
F.2d at 1159-60 (discovery initiated by parly 
claiming waiver should be considered when de-
termining prejudice) and Board of Educ. Taos 
Mun. Schools. 709 P.2d at 185-86 (initial stages 
of discovery found to be prejudicial because 
party seeking arbitration has both benefited 
from discovery and forced opposing party to 
undergo expense) with Sweater Bee by Banff. 
754 F.2d at 464 (no prejudice from discovery 
because discovery can be used in arbitration 
and additional discovery can be ordered) and 
Keating. 645 P.2d at 1206 (no prejudice from 
discovery because court ordered party seeking 
arbitration to cease discovery or extend equal 
discovery to party claiming waiver). While it is 
clear that there is disagreement over the preju-
dicial nature of discovery, it is important to 
note that factual differences—i.e., size and com-
plexity of the case, degree of discovery available 
under the particular arbitration contract, and 
degree of discovery available under the appro-
priate jurisdiction's arbitration statute—may ex-
plain some of the discrepancies. 
18. See supra note 6. 
3 6 0 Utah 833 PACIFIC REPORTER. 2d SERIES 
favors. However, there is an affirmative 
duty to enforce contractual rights; ,9 it is 
not the policy of this court to allow a party 
to suffer prejudice because an opposing 
party has failed to timely assert a contrac-
tual right. We therefore adopt the princi-
ple that waiver of a right of arbitration 
must be based on both a finding of partic-
ipation in litigation to a point inconsistent 
with the intent to arbitrate and a finding of 
prejudice. As noted above, both prongs of 
this test turn on the facts of the individual 
case. Furthermore, consistent with the 
policy considerations, any real detriment is 
sufficient to support a finding of prejudice 
12,31 It is also to be observed that 
there is some confusion concerning the ap 
plicable standard of review of a trial 
court's ruling *ha! .«. pa:-*.;, has waived \':-.'-
right to arbitrate '" We arc of the vie v. 
that the requirements that a ruling of waiv 
er must rest on findings of substantial 
participation and prejudice, that the preju 
dice must relate to the delay in the asser 
lion of the right to arbitrate, and that th.-
prejudice be of such a nature that the party 
opposing arbitration suffers some real 
harm are legal standards. Whether the 
trial court employed the proper standards 
presents a legal question which is reviewed 
for correctness.21 However, the finding of 
the existence of substantial participation 
19. See Jones Motor Co.. 671 F 2d at 42. 
20. See Price, 791 P.2d at 1159 ("It appears to us 
that a finding that a party has waived its right to 
arbi t ra t ion is a legal conclusion subject to our 
plenary review, but that the findings upon 
which the conclusion is based are predicated 
quest ions of fact, which may not be over turned 
unless clearly erroneous." (emphasis in origi 
nal)); Shinto Shipping <>>. v. f'ibrcx <C Shipping 
Co., 572 F 2d 1328. I l i l (9th Cir.1978) ("We 
must uphold the district court 's decision unless 
we find an abuse of discretion."); Southwest 
Indust. Import & Export. Inc v. Wilmod Co.. 524 
F 2d 468. 470 n. 3 (5th Cir.1975) ("Wc consider 
the quest ion of waiver to be a conclusion of law 
not subject to the structures of limited review 
dictated by F.R.Civ.P 52(a) as to factual find 
ings of the Trial Court."). Burton-Dixie Corp . 
436 F.2d at 408 ("The question depends upon 
the facts of each case and usually must be 
determined by the trier of facts") . 
21. See, e.g., Creer v. Valley Bank <£ Trust. 770 
P.2d 113. 114 (Utah 1988). Scharf v BMC Corp. 
700 P.2d 1068. 1070 (Utah 1985) 
and the finding of the existence of preju-
dice are factual in nature.22 Therefore, the 
existence of these factors should be re-
viewed as factual determinations -' 
A reading of the trial court's memoran-
dum decision reveals that the court em-
ployed the proper legal standard and based 
its ruling on the findings of substantial 
participation and prejudice.21 Since the un-
derlying facts are not in dispute, the dis-
positive issue is whether there is sufficient 
support in the record to uphold the trial 
court's findings. 
(41 The record clearly supports the find-
ing that Blue Cross participated in the liti-
gation to a point inconsistent with arb;tra 
lion. Before Blue Cross moved to .••»!•. ;>--l 
.-.I'bitratio:!. it filed an answer, filed «•> cr •».-•> 
claim, participated m discovery !»-r ;;•.•; 
months, and reviewed the discovery \\-..\l 
had already taken place prior to its en-
trance into the case. These actions ••l*-.ir:y 
manifest an intent to proceed to t r t l 
1.5 | The record also supports the finding 
of prejudice. The prejudice is apparent 
from Blue Cross's participation in dis-
covery viewed in conjunction with the fact 
that there are multiple defendants in the 
case. It is clear from its cross-claim thai 
part of Blue Cross's defense is that Massa 
22. See. e.g.. Rcid Burton Constr., 614 F.2d at 702 
Burton-Dixie Corp., 436 F.2d at 408; Weigh 
Watchers. 398 F.Supp. at 1059; Keating. IS 
Ca! Rptr at 372. 64 5 P.2d at 1204; Doers. i ; 
Cal.Rptr at 839. 588 P.2d at 1263. Board " 
[.due Taos Mun. Schools. 709 P.2d at l 8 x / ' " " 
cd Nuclear Corp. 597 P.2d at 300. 
23. .Set.-, e.g.. Docile v. Bradley. 784 P.2d I 1 ; r 
1 1 78 (Utah 1989); Rcid v. Mutual of Omaha /-;. 
Cn. 776 P 2 d 896. 899 (Utah 1989). Ua 
K Co P. 52(a); see also Rcid Burton Constr . 61 
F 2d at 702; Burton-Dixie Corp., 436 F.2d at 40: 
Weight Watchers. 398 F.Supp. at 1059; A>w»"i 
183 Cal.Rpir. at 372. 645 P.2d at 1204. Doer 
151 Cal.Rptr. at 839. 588 P.2d at 1263; Board t 
Educ Taos Mun. Schools, 709 P.2d at 185; Unt 
ed Nuclear Corp., 597 P.2d at 300. 
24. Although the trial court did not make sep-
rate findings of fact, memorandum decisior 
may be regarded as findings of fact. Thomas 
Thomas. 569 P 2d 1119. 1121 (Utah 1977) 
ctfJ^lERPviJ^iJ^<fc'K6s9eBB(ifi,§HiELD <*tftkh ^36i 
cf. ateutarad 3S6.(uuii> iww 
'X<m£tMmifo'is''>restir&lbWfMiany al- ^Wia^ofiTniVe^ns^ne^liai^WFrep^re 
^whiMall^lreadytakVrPmce^Th'eihfor- 'SML* » ' / « . 
It must also be remembered that, as Blue 
concur. 
ZIMMERMAN, Justice:-(Concurring and 
Cross points out in its brief, there is only a ^Dissenting^ri^v- ^.t9b /** it. 
lhnit& Segree of discoVej^ available in ar- ^ r-&nfcrfwith thf majority's*statement of 
«tHd legal 'standard for detennihing whether 
a»$arty to% an agreement has waived a right 
to * demand "arbitration '^ Both substantial 
participation to a point inconsistent with an 
intent to arbitrate and» prejudice are re 
quired These requirements are consistent 
with Utah public policy favoring arbitra 
tion. Unfortunately, the way the majority 
applies this standard undermines this de-
clared policy Without addressing the first 
of-,these elements, I find that I cannot 
agree that the evidence of prejudice is suf-
ficient^ support a finding that, as a mat-
cterf'pyawff $ e secondielement is 'satisfied. 
^ffcRet^ding^(iie%t^daM'vo^review7l Jfind 
^tK^rt^dnty'a^positioB'pifzzlin^^ The*" trial 
court made'no factual findings on disputed 
evidence in dete/rainingv that the standard 
| , f i
 [WJithin that period the" [party seeking arbi 
i "U tration]"actively participated"Jin the* deposi-
cL«rations of the parties or witnesses; objected to 
y questions and cross-examined witnesses, ex 
ammed and made copies of documents, ob-
1
 tamed adjournments of scheduled depositions 
to accommodate his^clients; received from 
s [the parties claiming waiver] transcripts of all 
depositions taken prior to entry into the case 
[of the party seeking arbitration] as well as 
exhibits up to that date In sum, the mov 
ant obtained many benefits from the pretrial 
discovery process in,this lawsuit which would 
(tnot hayc been available had they demanded 
' . arbitration! reasonably Rafter the third-party 
- ^ W m p l i i S ^ a s ^ r V a i . ^ ' * ^'l ^ *- ? 1* 
s. UggeW, iQMytrs \lnc.j*386,FS\ipp? at«1047-48. 
titration,*? and at the time if the motion to 
compel, the discovery'relating to Massachu-
setts Mutual's liability was far more ad 
vanced than was the discovery relating to 
Blue Cross's liability Blue Cross there 
fore obtained a benefit from its delay in the 
assertion of the right to arbitrate that 
would not have been available had Blue 
Cross timely moved to stay the proceedings 
and compel arbitration2S 
The finding of prejudice is also supported 
by the expense that plaintiffs undertook in 
^conducting*discovery into Blue'Cross's lia-
bility and in prepanng to' respond to Blue 
^Cross's? discovery ^equest^ J The policies 
{favoring, arbitration are largely defeated 
when the ..right of arbitration is not raised 
until an opposing party has undertaken 
H*5. p ie arbitration clause which Blue Cross 
*/ claims is*part of the insurance policy provides 
-j that all disputes should be submitted to arbitra 
tp tioh under, the "rules of the American Arbitra 
o tion. Association " The rule o£ the American 
3» Arbitration Association applicable' to discovery 
W provides/ "Consistent with the expedited nature 
•£ of arbitration, the arbitrator may « establish 
JLtW l5*c c x lent of and schedule for the production 
- °* relevant documents and other information" 
v. (Emphasis added) 
/io c^^cyeral cases have observed that waiver can 
fot0^111^ '^ s u c h circumstances. See\ e.g. Carcich, 
g * * 8 9 ^ ^ * 6 9 6 , * Uggett <fr Myers Inc.l0L38O 
K'-I^HPRb** 1047-48; Board ol Educ. Taos Muru 
M&frJ$yM~*l 186. Indeed, the faefs tn 
J » a r e ¥ f e i l a 7 Yo? the i n W f c a k T ,I&e// is 
^ a w m v o l v i n ^ m u l t i p l e defendants; rclaims of 
W^^ftpn^llnda contractual rightjpf arbitra-
18 Wiro*n^he plaintiff and one of the dercn-
.
 ft * * % ! » wis joVhed rile iri the case. Jn 
; finding'that waived had occurred. thecoWr ob-
'fe* 
ilaboRushPTJ*?2d at 889 .^ >-*fi 
I **» *< 
ivr 
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for waiver was met, and there was no 
dispute as to the relevant facts. There-
fore, we have no occasion to search for any 
substantial evidence that might support a 
trial court's factual finding of prejudice 
The trial judge was either correct in con-
cluding that the uncontroverted facts satis-
fied the legal standard or he was not. 
There is no room here for the exercise of 
trial court discretion on this question. Yet 
the majority seems to apply a "clear error" 
standard to uphold the trial judge's ruling. 
This appeal presents a plain question of 
law. Is the evidence sufficient to support a 
legal conclusion that both elements of 
waiver are present? See Page v Moseley, 
Hallgarten, Estabrook & Weeden, Inc., 
806 F2d 291, 294 (1st Cir.i986) I think 
not 
I proceed directly to the second element. 
Neither the majority nor plaintiffs are able 
to point to an\ real prejudice resulting 
from Blue Cross's filing pleadings and par-
ticipating in tins litigation over the four 
and one-half months between the time it 
entered an appearance and the time it 
sought arbitration And to put thih matter 
in perspective, it must be noted that plain-
tiffs and defendants other than Blue Cross 
had been engaged in this litigation for one 
year before the Blue Cross defendants 
were made parties. 
It is true that Blue Cross filed pleadings, 
but that fact certainly did not cause legally 
sufficient prejudice to plaintiffs. As for 
the discovery that the majority says Blue 
Cross "actively participated in" in the few 
months following its being joined as a par-
ty, Blue Cross was nothing more than a 
passive participant in depositions initiated 
by plaintiffs and directed primarily at Mas-
sachusetts Mutual. Respecting other dis-
covery, it is hard to understand how plain-
tiffs were significantly prejudiced by hav-
ing Blue Cross produce documents in re-
sponse to plaintiffs' request for production 
and answering plaintiffs' interrogatories. 
And as for Blue Cross's discovery requests 
directed to plaintiffs, they were never an-
swered and there is no evidence in the 
record that plaintiffs expended any time or 
effort on them. 
At bottom, all we have here is the pas-
sage of close to five months and the almost 
entirely passive participation of a newly 
joined party in ongoing litigation. I would 
hold that the articulated legal standard 
adopted by the court cannot be satisfied by 
such circumstances. I would reverse and 
remand with direction that the Blue Cross 
arbitration claim be addressed on its merits 
and that, to the extent an arbitration clause 
is binding on any of the parties, arbitration 
be ordered 
HOWE, Associate C.J , concurs in the 
concurring and dissenting opinion of 
Justice ZIMMERMAN. 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Ronnie S. BROOKS, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 900540-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
May 12, 1992 
Defendant was convicted in the Third 
District Court, Salt Lake County, James S. 
Sawaya, J., of aggravated sexual assault 
and aggravated burglary. Defendant ap-
pealed The Court of Appeals, Greenwood, 
J., held that: (i) trial court has no affirma-
tive duty to sua sponte engage in on-the-
record colloquy with defendant at time of 
trial to ensure valid waiver of right tc 
testify, and (2) trial court's reasonable 
doubt instruction did not contain inappro 
priate language which reasonable juroi 
might have interpreted as allowing finding 
of guilt based on degree of proof belov* 
that required by due process clause. 
Affirmed. 
settlement of civil case, 6 A.L.R.3d 1457. 
Necessity and propriety of counter-affidavits 
in opposition to motion for new trial in civil 
case, 7 A.L.R.3d 1000. 
Quotient verdicts, 8 A.L.R.3d 335. 
propriety and prejudicial effect of instruc-
tions in civil case as affected by the manner in 
which they are written, 10 A.L.R.3d 501. 
Prejudicial effect of unauthorized view by 
jury in civil case of scene of accident or pre-
mises in question, 11 A.L.R.3d 918. 
Propriety and prejudicial effect of reference 
by counsel in civil case to result of former trial 
of same case, or amount of verdict therein, 15 
A.L.R.3d 1101. 
Absence of judge from courtroom during trial 
of civil case, 25 A.L.R.3d 637. 
Juror's voir dire denial or nondisclosure of 
acquaintance or relationship with attorney in 
case, or with partner or associate of such attor-
ney, as ground for new trial or mistrial, 64 
AL.R.3d 126. 
Amendment, after expiration of time for fil-
ing motion for new trial, in civil case, of motion 
made in due time, 69 A.L.R.3d 845. 
Authority of state court to order jury trial in 
civil case where jury has been waived or not 
demanded by parties, 9 A.L.R.4th 1041. 
Deafness of juror as ground for impeaching 
verdict, or securing new trial or reversal on 
appeal, 38 A.L.R.4th 1170. 
Jury trial waiver as binding on later state 
civil trial, 48 A.L.R.4th 747. 
Court reporter's death or disability prior to 
transcribing notes as grounds for reversal or 
new trial, 57 A.L.R.4th 1049. 
Propriety of limiting to issue of damages 
alone new trial granted on ground of inade-
quacy of damages — modern cases, 5 A.L.R.5th 
875. 
After-acquired evidence of employee's mis-
conduct as barring or limiting recovery in ac-
tion for wrongful discharge, 34 A.L.R.5th 699. 
Inattention of juror from sleepiness or other 
cause as ground for reversal or new trial, 59 
A.L.R.5th 1. 
Excessiveness or adequacy of compensatory 
damages for personal injury to or death of 
seaman in actions under Jones Act (46 USCS 
Appx. § 688) or doctrine of unseaworthiness — 
modern cases, 96 A.L.R. Fed. 541. 
Excessiveness or adequacy of awards of dam-
ages for personal injury or death in actions 
under Federal Employers' Liability Act (45 
USCS §§ 51 et seq.) — modern cases, 97 A.L.R. 
Fed. 189. 
Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order. 
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts 
of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may be 
corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of any 
party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the pendency of 
an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is docketed in 
the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending may be so 
corrected with leave of the appellate court. 
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; 
fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the 
furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final 
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvert-
ence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by 
due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial 
under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or 
extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the 
judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, 
or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise 
vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective 
application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the 
judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time andJhr_reasons 
(lXjft), or (37. notjiiore than 3 months after the judgment>_Qrder^or proceeding 
was gifttgred_or taken. A motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the 
finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the 
power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a 
judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the 
court. The procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by 
motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independent action. 
(Amended effective April 1, 1998.) 
Advisory Committee Note. — The 1998 
amendment eliminates as grounds for a motion 
the following: a(4) when, for any cause, the 
summons in an action has not been personally 
served upon the defendant as required by Rule 
4(e) and the defendant has failed to appear in 
said action."This basis for a motion is not found 
in the federal rule. The committee concluded 
